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Path Dependence in Energy Systems                                                                        
and Economic Development1 
Roger Fouquet, GRI, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) 
 
Abstract 
Energy systems are subject to strong and long-lived path dependence, due to technological, 
infrastructural, institutional and behavioural lock-ins. Yet, with the prospect of providing accessible 
cheap energy to stimulate economic development and reduce poverty, governments often invest in 
large engineering projects and subsidy policies. Here, I argue that while these may achieve their 
objectives, they risk locking their economies onto energy-intensive pathways. Thus, particularly when 
economies are industrializing, and their energy systems are being transformed and not yet fully 
locked-in, policy-makers should take care before directing their economies onto energy-intensive 
pathways that are likely to be detrimental to the long run prosperity of their economies.  
Introduction  
In the late 1980s, economists were offered a theoretical explanation for why markets can fail to move 
towards the socially optimal outcome, even in the long run
1
. Building on the classic example of the 
QWERTY keyboard and other case studies, such as the dominance of inferior VHS videotapes, an 
explanation was given for how increasing returns to scale, as well as learning and network effects, 
could lead an economy (or system, more generally) to be faced with multiple potential outcomes and 
how the eventual outcome depended on circumstances in the early history of particular technologies
2
. 
In other words, history mattered, and, if the ‘wrong’ path was followed, the economy could be stuck 
in a socially sub-optimal outcome.  
                                                          
1
. I would like to thank Fergus Green, Andreas Kopp and Nick Stern for discussions on the topic. Financial 
support from the ESRC is gratefully acknowledged.   
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Shortly afterwards, an example was given of path dependence within an energy system that showed 
how water pressurised nuclear reactors became the dominant technology through a series of historical 
coincidences
3
. Then, studies began to outline the implication of technological lock-ins for addressing 
climate change
4-6
. After a quieter decade on this front, the recent explosion in long run and historical 
research has offered a number of new examples of path dependence.  
A better understanding of path dependence in energy systems is critical and urgent for two reasons. 
First, current efforts to stabilise the climate require unlocking industrialised economies from their 
existing fossil fuel energy systems
6
. Second, the period of global economic growth in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s was associated with a wave of industrialisation in a number of developing economies. 
Industrialisation is a time of heavy investment creating lock-ins and ultimately path dependence. 
Thus, it is critical and urgent that lock-ins and path dependence be better understood, their 
implications identified and strategies to deal with them formulated.    
Given that the role of path dependence in unlocking from the current fossil fuel-based system is 
receiving new attention
7-9
, the purpose of this Perspective is to pull together examples related to 
energy systems, and explore their interlinkages with economic development and the energy intensity 
of the economy, drawing attention to the potential burdens from locking-into an energy-intensive 
economy. My aim is to connect the micro-studies of path dependence with the macro-level 
implications. Because of the scale of the topic, this Perspective can only offer a few examples from a 
cross-country and historical viewpoint, in the hope of stimulating further research and debate. 
Energy Demand and Economic Development   
Access to cheap energy is seen to be fundamental for economic development and for reducing poverty 
– especially with more than one billion people globally currently without access to electricity10,11. In 
parallel, the expansion of an energy-related physical infrastructure has frequently been critical to the 
provision of abundant cheap energy
12
. Thus, there tends to be a positive feedback between energy 
resources, infrastructure and industrial development, locking an economy into specific consumption 
patterns
13-15
.  
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Long run demand for mobility (and its associated energy consumption) at a given level of per capita 
income is heavily determined by the urban and national transport network
16,17
. The expansion of 
transportation infrastructure is typically seen to generate additional ‘induced demand’, principally by 
initially lowering the cost of travel due to shorter travel times
18
. It is associated with urban sprawl and 
often used as an argument against expanding road infrastructure. Certainly, in the USA, increased 
provision of roads appears unlikely to do much to relieve congestion, though it does increase total 
amount of travel
19
. Thus, all things being equal, greater transport infrastructure is likely to increase the 
energy intensity of the economy and lock it into a higher energy intensity pathway
20
.  
A form of induced demand is also likely to occur in other energy-related engineering projects, such as 
large-scale hydroelectric dams and nuclear power stations, which create sudden and dramatic 
increases in power supply. Such energy projects can also leave long-term legacies of local poverty, 
distributional inequality and environmental damage (see BOX 1). However, once completed, these 
megaprojects do tend to offer low marginal costs of energy production. For the economy’s 
development, reducing the constraints on energy use and the associated prices is clearly seen as 
desirable. This drives up energy consumption, putting the economy on a new (if energy-intensive) 
path. Commentators have argued that mega-projects are often implemented to ambitiously transform 
society
21,22
.  
Yet, many
23-25
 recommend against developing economies investing in energy mega-projects, because 
their costs are consistently under-estimated and, in many cases, they do not to offer positive cost-
benefit analyses. Moreover conventional cost-benefit analyses struggle to quantify the unintended and 
non-linear costs and benefits of projects
21
. Furthermore, the lure of cheap and abundant power can 
seduce economies into energy-intensive behaviour that eventually makes it vulnerable to energy 
shortages
26,27
 (see below).  
A crucial point is that the role of energy services on economic development is likely to change at 
different phases of economic development
28
. For instance, during the Industrial Revolution, the 
influence of declining energy service prices on economic growth appears to have changed greatly 
4 
 
over time
29
. Increases in energy use and improvements in energy efficiency were the main sources of 
economic growth in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but not in the second half of the 
twentieth century
30
. Thus, one lesson learned might be that, if timed and managed correctly (e.g., at 
the right phase of economic development, and tied-in with policies promoting structural 
transformation – as occurred in South Korea in the 1960s and 1970s31), judicious infrastructure 
projects reducing energy prices can help kick-start the economy, but, at the wrong time or if poorly 
managed, they will only feed through into inefficient energy consumption, and large debts.   
Locking-into Energy-Intensive Systems  
Certainly, there are signs of energy-intensive economic development today. Given that the 
efficiencies of energy technologies have improved dramatically over the last two hundred years
32
 and 
played a role in declining energy intensities (that is, the energy use to GDP ratio)
 33,34
, one study set-
out to identify whether currently developing economies are less energy-intensive than present day 
OECD countries, when they were at similar levels of economic development
35
. It identified three 
factors influencing their energy-intensities: more efficient technologies today; more exporting in 
developing economies today; and more consuming of energy-intensive bundles today. The first of 
these factors would drive down energy intensity, while the other two clearly increase it. However, the 
study found evidence of increased energy-intensity overall, arguing that these two latter factors have 
outweighed the first factor
35
. In other words, today’s developing economies appear to be following 
energy-intensive pathways
36,11
, potentially associated with technological, infrastructural, behavioural 
and institutional lock-ins.  
Although infrastructure is arguably the most powerful and long-lasting lock-in, defining the 
geography of a country and the behaviour of an economy for centuries and even millennia
37,38
, the 
most commonly referred-to lock-ins relate to technologies (see BOX 2). Yet, evidence is also 
emerging of behavioural lock-ins associated with energy production and consumption. One study 
finds that path dependence (i.e. persistent behaviour sixty years after conditions changed) is 
responsible for 60% of total coal-fired power station capacity in certain counties in the USA
39
. Two 
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other examples of path dependence show that the proximity to nineteenth century coal mines in the 
US and the UK has been associated with less-developed entrepreneurial cultures today
40,41
. Another 
study indicates that temporary rationing policies can have long term effects on behaviour
42
. In that 
work, extreme electricity shortages in the Brazilian South-East due to low rainfall were shown to 
force regional authorities to introduce strong demand-side management programmes that altered 
habits, evident ten years later. In other words, factors (including policies) can drive consumption 
down, as well as up.  
Often policies can be influenced by the institutional and market structure, which becomes the source 
of the path dependence. Although more research is needed
43
, there is likely to be a correlation 
between the size of corporations, market power and energy system lock-ins. Large companies and 
more concentrated industries will have greater financial wealth and will be better coordinated to lobby 
governments (also known as regulatory capture or rent-seeking) to protect a particular energy 
system
44
. Certainly, where nuclear power is dominant, and the electricity industry is both highly 
concentrated and connected with related policy decisions, such as in France, it is harder to move 
towards liberalised and competitive markets and potentially different energy systems
45
.  
Even more evident was the dominance of energy-intensive companies in the $1.5bn spent on lobbying 
associated with the failed US climate policy known as the Waxman-Markey Bill
46
. In 2014, eight of 
the top ten largest companies in the world (as measured by sales revenue) were oil or car companies
47
. 
In other words, there is (and has been for a long time) considerable financial and political power to 
support the fossil fuel status quo
48
. More generally, the market power of energy companies can 
heavily influence the degree of lock-in of a particular energy system.    
Subsidies, which are lobbied for by energy companies, play a critical role in placing economies on 
energy-intensive pathways – though they are often introduced to boost production and employment on 
the supply-side and reduce fuel poverty on the demand-side. As shown in Figure 1, there is a close 
positive relationship between per capita subsidies and per capita consumption of petroleum, natural 
gas and coal (for more than fifty energy-producing developing and industrialised economies) – though 
6 
 
causality can certainly not be attributed because of the complexity of disentangling the interaction 
between economic development, production, consumption and energy prices. Thus, the existence of 
US$4.6 trillion of global fossil fuel subsidies (including the external costs of energy production, 
distribution and consumption
49
) in 2013 (or 6% of global GDP) is associated with higher per capita 
consumption, and may be linked to lock-ins favouring energy-intensive production and consumption. 
Thus, the full impact of removing subsidies will probably take many decades (if not centuries) to 
change.    
As an example, in 2013, post-tax subsidies in the USA amounted to US$350 billion for petroleum 
products, US$78 billion for natural gas and US$178 billion for coal – thus, US$605 billion of 
subsidies on fossil fuels, equivalent to 3.75% of the USA’s GDP49. These subsidies have undoubtedly 
been in place for a long time - at least 100 years for the fossil fuel industry in the USA
50
 – locking the 
economy into an even higher level of energy intensity than it would be without subsidies. It has been 
argued that American policies have increased the US economy’s energy intensity and done so at a 
high cost to the economy and society
51
. 
The Burden of Locking-Into Energy-Intensive Systems  
Most of the lock-ins mentioned have forced economies onto more energy-intensive pathways than 
might have occurred in ‘socially-optimal’ market conditions, and imply that, if circumstances change, 
consumption patterns will fail to adjust fully for a very long time. Certainly, economies with higher 
energy intensities are more vulnerable to the impacts of an oil shock
52
. While rising energy prices can 
stimulate energy efficiency improvements
53,54
, these improvements are slow to be adopted
55
 and an 
‘efficiency gap’ exists between the most efficient technology and what consumers use56. This inability 
to adjust in the long run, in part due to path dependence, creates a major vulnerability.  
This long term lock-in-induced vulnerability to energy price shocks implies market failures and 
potential costs to the economy and society. For instance, the disruption component of the social cost 
of oil in 2004 ranged from US$2 to US$8 per additional barrel of oil consumed by the USA and 
highlights the benefits to the American economy and society from reducing imports of oil
57
. As a 
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result of these types of disruptions, many governments have sought to develop energy security 
policies. 
Energy security policies can work on supply-side or demand-side
58
. In the USA, over the last thirty 
years, the annual costs of demand-side management projects have been between 0.01% and 0.04% of 
GDP
59,60
. While there has been some criticism about the estimated benefits of demand side 
management projects
61,62
, they have achieved reductions in vulnerability to rising energy prices
59
. 
Nonetheless, despite these benefits, demand-side management efforts in the USA peaked in the early 
1990s
59
, then remained low until 2008
60
. Thus, such policies appear to be at their lowest when energy 
price hikes occur (such as in 1973, 1979 and 2008) and so tend to be reactive, rather than proactive. 
Furthermore, these policies rarely address the underlying energy system, particularly related to key 
infrastructure, and focus more on incremental improvements in the efficiency of energy technologies. 
Thus, demand-side management offers little real opportunity to place the economy on a less energy-
intensive pathway.     
Rather than using resources more efficiently, the history of economic development has tended to be 
based on dealing with resource scarcity by opening-up new frontiers or exploiting new reserves
63
. In 
turn, supply-side energy security policies aggravate energy-intensive lock-ins. Naturally, some 
countries have been more aggressive in their supply-side energy policies than others. As an example, 
the USA’s military expenditures to ensure oil supplies from the Persian Gulf has been estimated. In 
2004, the price tag for oil consumers, US oil companies and world oil price stability was estimated to 
be between 0.2% and 0.6% of GDP
64
 – and this estimate has now been revised upwards by 300% to 
600%
65,66
. However, this example is not an isolated incident – a study67 looking over more than 60 
years and 600 conflicts found that, when a country has oil reserves very near the border, the 
probability of conflict is three times greater than if neither country has oil (while strategic objectives 
on the production-side and associated revenue are likely to be a key driver of this finding, it is hard to 
exclude the influence of national objectives to meet energy demands). In other words, efforts to 
ensure the security of supply of oil and energy more generally - arguably to counteract the market 
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failures due to path dependence in energy systems - have imposed substantial burdens on economies 
and societies.  
Conclusions  
The purpose of this Perspective was to discuss the implications of path dependence in energy systems 
for economic development, and stimulate further research and debate. The discussion should not 
discourage governments from seeking to use energy policies to assist objectives of economic 
development and poverty alleviation. Instead, it offers a reminder to policy-makers that cheap energy 
is not a ‘silver bullet’ and can instead have a hidden price tag, especially in the long run. 
Economic development needs access to cheap energy services, just as it needs cheap capital and 
labour. Infrastructure and other large engineering projects, as well as subsidies, can help to provide 
energy service access at low prices. If well directed, such policies may boost economic development 
and reduce poverty. Thus, these may be socially desirable, particularly at early phases of economic 
development.   
However, the role of energy services in economic development changes at different income levels. 
For example, the potential large net benefits of such policies at early phases of industrialization may 
become net costs on the economy at later phases. So, care should be taken before embarking on large 
scale projects and policies that leave an economy heavily in debt and offer little growth and 
development. Furthermore, cheap energy tends to lock economies into energy-intensive patterns 
(related to technologies, infrastructures, institutions, and behaviour) that are likely to be detrimental to 
the prosperity of the economy in the long run, increasing the economy’s vulnerability to energy price 
shocks, inflation, trade balance deficits, political pressures from energy companies and environmental 
pollution.  
Once an economy is locked-into an energy system, the government rarely has opportunities to redirect 
it (see BOX 3). Thus, when an economy is industrialising, and its energy system is being formed (or 
transformed) and not yet fully locked-in, it is crucial for its long run prosperity that an economy gets 
on the ‘right’ path. In addition, this is likely to reduce the costs of meeting global environmental 
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regulation that will, no doubt, eventually be pressed on even the least developed economies. Indeed, 
the December 2015 agreement in Paris suggests that all economies will eventually need to un-lock 
themselves from the fossil fuel energy system and, therefore, that industrialising economies may want 
to avoid locking themselves into this antiquated energy system altogether.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Subsidies and Consumption of fossil fuels in energy-producing economies. The figure 
plots the relationship between per capita subsidies and per capita consumption of oil (red diamonds), 
natural gas (green squares) and coal (blue triangles) amongst energy-producing economies in 2013. 
Data taken from refs 49, 68.  
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Box 1: The Long Run Effects of Hydroelectric Dams  
The state of Kerala in India offers an example of the dangers of energy-intensive path-dependence. 
Low power costs due to abundant hydropower in the 1930s enabled Kerala to develop quickly 
(relative to its neighbouring states) by investing in chemical industries. However, the cheap power 
and the chemical industries locked the economy into a relatively energy-intensive development path, 
which, by the 1980s, made it unable to develop further, because of the limits of the hydropower 
supply and the high costs of importing fossil fuels
26
. Thus, the lure of cheap and abundant power can 
seduce economies into energy-intensive behaviour that eventually makes them vulnerable to energy 
shortages.  
Large scale energy projects like hydroelectric dams also often leave ambivalent long-run legacies for 
the economy. Dams built for the Tennessee Valley Authority in the USA helped trigger an increase in 
electricity consumption, though they did little to stimulate regional economic development, as is often 
believed
27
. In a broader study
69
, dams built in India were found to offer some benefits for 
communities downstream, modestly improving agricultural productivity. However, this was at the 
expense of increasing poverty in surrounding areas. Thus, the development of these major engineering 
projects to generate power created large and long-lasting distributional effects that locked certain 
communities into poverty traps. 
Box 2: Path Dependent Energy Technologies  
A number of different technologies initially competed in the markets for personal transport
4
, electric 
current
5
 and nuclear power
3
. However, in each of these markets, only one technology was likely to 
dominate in the long run, because of increasing returns to scale resulting from repeated or mass 
production. An early head-start was crucial for the successful dominance of a particular technology, 
enabling large production, declining average unit costs and, ultimately, widespread adoption. Thus, 
small historical events early-on in the competition pushed an energy system towards one particular 
technology, which in turn increased its likelihood of becoming the dominant technology
1
. For 
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instance, in the late 1940s, the US Navy chose to use light water reactors in its submarines, implying 
that, in the early 1950s, the US Atomic Energy Commission (under pressure following signs of Soviet 
nuclear ambitions) selected this technology because it offered the fastest means of generating nuclear 
power, which key European countries then adopted in the 1960s because of the financial aid they 
would receive from importing the American technology
3
. Today, light water reactors dominate 
nuclear power production, despite having been seen as more expensive and less safe than other 
nuclear power technologies
3
. In this case, and many others, technologies were boosted by their 
complementarities with other goods, strengthening potential lock-ins
7
. In addition, looking at the 
automotive industry internationally, one study found that firms tend to direct innovation towards their 
existing expertise
70
. In other words, lock-ins are not just prevalent amongst chosen technologies, but 
also within the R&D process, implying that energy systems are likely to be locked-in far longer than 
originally believed
71
. 
Box 3: Opportunities to Change Pathway  
It is unclear how often opportunities for change (or critical junctures
72
) occur. If there are any 
patterns, they are likely to vary according to whether they are associated with technological, 
infrastructural, political or behavioural changes. One concrete example (indirectly related to energy 
systems, since it does not obviously affect energy consumption) is the techno-institutional lock-in 
associated with left-hand drive cars (such as in the UK and Japan, but also South-Eastern Africa). In 
the UK, critical junctures – opportunities to transform the system – would have arguably occurred in 
1895 (when the first cars were being built), in 1914 (when the Model-T Ford and its mass production 
were introduced to the UK, and there were 106,000 cars registered in 1913), perhaps in 1945 after 
World War II (but by then there were already 2 million cars on the roads), and in 1973 (when the UK 
joined the European Economic Community and the issue was considered in British Government 
studies, although  the costs (US$5.4 billion in today’s money, associated with changing cars and 
motorway junctions) were deemed too high compared with the benefits; and by which time there were 
14 million cars). Thus, critical junctures only occurred roughly every 30 years for this specific and 
12 
 
contained techno-institutional problem. For more complex lock-ins, the frequency of critical junctures 
and opportunities for change could be even less often
72
. 
 
References 
1. Arthur, W.B. (1989) ‘Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical 
Events.’ The Economic Journal 99(2) 116-131. 
2. David, P.A. (1985) ‘Clio and the Economics of QWERTY.’ American Economic Review 75(2) 
332-7. 
3. Cowan, R. (1990) ‘Nuclear Power Reactors: A Study in Technological Lock-in.’ Journal of 
Economic History 50: 541-67. 
4. Cowan, R. & Hultén, S. (1996) ‘Escaping lock-in: The case of the electric vehicle.’ Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change 53(1) 61-80. 
5. Unruh, G.C. (2000) ‘Understanding carbon lock-in.’ Energy Policy 28: 817-830. 
6. Unruh, G.C. (2002) ‘Escaping carbon lock-in.’ Energy Policy 30 317–325. 
7. Foxon T.J., Pearson P.J.G., Arapostathis S., Carlsson-Hyslop A., and Thornton J. (2013) 
‘Branching points for transition pathways: Assessing responses of actors to challenges on pathways to 
a low carbon future.’ Energy Policy 52 146-158. 
8. Acemoglu, Daron, Philippe Aghion, Leonardo Bursztyn, and David Hemous (2012) ‘The 
Environment and Directed Technical Change.’ American Economic Review 102(1) 131–166. 
9. Acemoglu, D., Akcigit, U., Hanley, D., Kerr, W. (2016) ‘Transition to Clean Technology.’ Journal 
of Political Economy 124(1) 52-104. 
10. Wolfram, C., Shelef, O. and Gertler, P. (2012) "How Will Energy Demand Develop in the 
Developing World?"  Journal of Economic Perspectives 26(1) 119-38. 
13 
 
11. Johansson et al. (2012) Global Energy Assessment: Toward a Sustainable Future. Cambridge 
University Press. Cambridge. 
12. Donaldson, D., & Hornbeck, R. (2016) ‘Railroads and American Economic Growth: A "Market 
Access" Approach.’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 131(2) 799-858. 
13. Hughes, T.P. (1983). Networks of power: Electrification in western society, 1880-1930. USA: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 
14. Wright, G. (1990) ‘The Origins of American Industrial Success, 1879-1940.’ American Economic 
Review 80(4) 651-68. 
15. Fernihough, A. and O'Rourke, K.H. (2014) "Coal and the European Industrial Revolution," NBER 
Working Papers 19802, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
16. Grubler, A. (1990) The Rise and Fall of Infrastructures: Dynamics of Evolution and Technological 
Change in Transport. Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg, Germany.  
17. Goodwin, P.B. (1996) Empirical evidence on induced traffic, a review and synthesis. 
Transportation. 23(1) 35-54. 
18. Hymel, Kent, Ken Small and Kurt Van Dender (2010) ‘Induced demand and rebound effects in 
road transport.’ Transportation Research Part B: Methodological 44(10) 1220–1241.  
19. Duranton, G. and Turner, M.A. (2011) ‘The Fundamental Law of Road Congestion: Evidence 
from US Cities.’ American Economic Review 101(6) 2616-52. 
20. Nye, D.E. (1998) Consuming Power: A Social History of American Energies. MIT Press. 
Cambridge, MA. 
21. Hirschman, A.O. (1967) Development Projects Observed. Brookings Institution. Washington D.C. 
22. Flyvbjerg, B. (2014) What You Should Know about Megaprojects and Why: An Overview, 2014, 
Project Management Journal, vol. 45, no. 2, April-May, pp. 6-19. 
14 
 
23. Ansar, A. Flyvbjerg, B., Budzier, A., Lunn, D. (2014) ‘Should we build more large dams? The 
actual costs of hydropower mega project development.’ Energy Policy 69 43-56. 
24. Grubler, A. (2010) ‘The costs of the French nuclear scale- up: a case of negative learning by 
doing’, Energy Policy, 38(9), 5174–88. 
25. Sovacool, B.K. and Cooper, C.J. (2013) The Governance of Energy Megaprojects: Politics, 
Hubris, and Energy Security. Edward Elgar Publications. Cheltenham. 
26. Thomas, J.J. (2005) ‘Kerala’s Industrial Backwardness: A Case of Path Dependence in 
Industrialization?’ World Development 33(5) 763-783. 
27. Kitchens, C. (2014) ‘The Role of Publicly Provided Electricity in Economic Development: The 
Experience of the Tennessee Valley Authority, 1929–1955.’ Journal of Economic History 74(2) 389-
419.   
28. Toman, M.T. and Jemelkova, B. (2003) ‘Energy and Economic Development: An Assessment of 
the State of Knowledge.’ The Energy Journal 24(4) 93-112. 
29. Fouquet, R. (2014) ‘The role of energy technologies in long run economic growth.’ IAEE Energy 
Forum 8(3) 11-13. 
30. Stern, D.I. and Kander, A. (2012) ‘The Role of Energy in the Industrial Revolution and Modern 
Economic Growth.’ The Energy Journal 33(3) 127-54. 
31. Pearson, P.J.G. (2016) ‘Energy transitions.’ in Steven Durlauf and Lawrence Blume (eds.) New 
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillian Publishing. 
32. Fouquet, R. (2011) ‘Divergences in long run trends in the prices of energy and energy services.’ 
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 5(2) 196-218. 
33. Sue Wing, I. (2008) Explaining the declining energy intensity of the U.S. economy. Resource and 
Energy Economics 30: 21–49. 
15 
 
34. Csereklyei, Z., Rubio Varas, M.d.M., and Stern, D.I. (2016) ‘Energy and economic growth: The 
stylized facts.’ Energy Journal 37(2) 223-255. 
35. van Benthem, A. (2015) ‘Energy Leapfrogging.’ Journal of the Association of Environmental and 
Resource Economists, 2(1) 93-132. 
36. Stern, D. I. (2012) Modeling international trends in energy efficiency, Energy Economics 34, 
2200–2208. 
37. Bleakley, H. and Lin, J. (2012) ‘Portage and Path Dependence.’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 
127 (2) 587-644. 
38. Michaels, G. and Rauch, F. (2013) ‘Resetting the Urban Network: 117-2012.’ Economics Series 
Working Papers 684, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. 
39. Meng, K.C. (2016) ‘Path Dependence in U.S. Coal-Fired Electricity.’ American Economic 
Association Annual Meeting, 4 January.  
40. Glaeser, E.L., Kerr, S.P., Kerr, W.R. (2015) ‘Entrepreneurship and urban growth: empirical 
assessment with historical mines.’ Review of Economics and Statistics 97 498-520. 
41. Stuetzer, M., Obschonka, M., Audretsch, D. B., Wyrwich, M. Rentfrow. P. J., Coombes, M., 
Shaw-Taylor, L., Satchell, M. (2016). Industry structure, entrepreneurship, and culture: An empirical 
analysis using historical coalfields. European Economic Review.  
42. Gerard, F. (2013) What Changes Energy Consumption, and for How Long? New Evidence from 
the 2001 Brazilian Electricity Crisis. RFF Discussion Paper 13-06. Resources for the Future. 
Washington D.C. 
43. Pezzey, J.C.V. (2014) ‘The influence of lobbying on climate policies; or, why the world might 
fail.’ Environment and Development Economics 19(3) 329 – 332. 
44. Laffont, J.J., and Tirole, J. (1993) A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. 
Cambridge: MIT Press.  
16 
 
45. Glachant, J.M. and Finon, D. (2005) ‘A Competitive Fringe in the Shadow of a State Owned 
Incumbent: The Case of France.’ The Energy Journal Vol. 26 Special Issue: European Electricity 
Liberalisation. 181-204. 
46. Meng, K.C. (2016) Using a Free Permit Rule to Forecast the Marginal Abatement Cost of 
Proposed Climate Policy NBER Working Paper. 22255. National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Cambridge, MA.http://www.nber.org/papers/w22255.pdf 
47. Forbes (2015) http://www.forbes.com/global2000/ Accessed on 29 November 2015. 
48. Barbier, E. (2013) ‘Is a global crisis required to prevent climate change? A historical–institutional 
perspective’ in Fouquet, R. (ed.) Handbook on Energy and Climate Change. Edward Elgar 
Publications. Cheltenham, UK, and Northampton, MA, USA. 
49. Coady, D, Parry, I., Sears, L. and Shang, B. (2015) How large are global energy subsidies? IMF 
Working Paper WP/15/105. International Monetary Fund. 
50. Pfund, N. and B. Healey (2011) What Would Jefferson Do? The Historical Role of Federal 
Subsidies in Shaping America’s Energy Future. DBL Investors. 
51. Lipsey, R.G., Carlaw, K.I. and Bekar, C.T. (2005) Economic Transformations: General Purpose 
Technologies and Long Term Economic Growth. Oxford University Press. Oxford. p.79. 
52. Acurio-Vásconez, V. Giraud, G. McIsaac, F. Pham, N.S. (2015) ‘The effects of oil price shocks in 
a new-Keynesian framework with capital accumulation.’ Energy Policy 86 844-854. 
53. Popp, D. (2002) ‘Induced Innovation and Energy Prices.’ American Economic Review 92(1) 160-
180. 
54. Newell, R.G., Jaffe, A.B., and Stavins, R.N. (1999) ‘The induced innovation hypothesis and 
energy-saving technological change.’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(3) 941 – 975. 
17 
 
55. Fowlie, M., Greenstone, M. and Wolfram, C. (2015) ‘Are the Non-monetary Costs of Energy 
Efficiency Investments Large? Understanding Low Take-Up of a Free Energy Efficiency Program.’  
American Economic Review 105(5) 201-04. 
56. Gillingham, K. and Palmer, K. (2014) ‘Bridging the Energy Efficiency Gap: Policy Insights from 
Economic Theory and Empirical Analysis.’ Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 8(1) 18-
38. 
5762. Leiby, P.N. (2007) Estimating the Energy Security Benefits of Reduced U. S. Oil Imports, 
ORNL/TM-2007/028, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.  
58. Goldthau, A. and Sovacool, B.K. (2012) ‘The uniqueness of the energy security, justice, and 
governance problem.’ Energy Policy 41 232-240. 
59. Gillingham, K., Newell, R. and Palmer, K. (2006) ‘Energy Efficiency Policies: A Retrospective 
Examination.’ Annual Review of Environment and Resources 31 193-237. 
60. US Energy Information Administration (EIA) (2015) Table 10.5. Demand-Side Management 
Program Direct and Indirect Costs. https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/epa_10_05.html 
Accessed 13 January 2016. 
61. Auffhammer, M., Blumstein, C. and Fowlie, M. (2008) ‘Demand Side Management and Energy 
Efficiency Revisited.’ The Energy Journal 29(3) 91-104. 2008. 
62. Fowlie, M., Greenstone, M. and Wolfram, C. (2015) ‘Are the Non-monetary Costs of Energy 
Efficiency Investments Large? Understanding Low Take-Up of a Free Energy Efficiency Program.’  
American Economic Review 105(5) 201-04. 
63. Barbier, E.B. (2011) Scarcity and Frontiers: How Economies have Developed Through Natural 
Resource Exploitation. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.  
64. Delucchi, M.A. and Murphy, J. (2008) “U.S. Military Expenditures to Protect the Use of Persian-
Gulf Oil for Motor Vehicles,” Energy Policy, 36, 2253-2264. 
18 
 
6571. Stiglitz, J.E. and L.J. Bilmes (2008) The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq 
Conflict. W.W. Norton. New York. 
66. Stiglitz, J.E. (2015) ‘Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz on "Rewriting the Rules of the American 
Economy" (Part 2).’  
http://www.democracynow.org/2015/10/27/nobel_laureate_joseph_stiglitz_on_rewriting_the 
67. Caselli, F., Morelli, M. and Rohner, D. (2015) ‘The Geography of Interstate Resource Wars.’ 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 130(1) 267-315. 
68. BP (2015) Statistical Review of World Energy 2015. BP plc. London. 
69. Duflo, E., and Pande, R. (2007) ‘Dams.’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(2) 601–46. 
70. Aghion, P., A. Dechezlepretre, D. Hemous, R. Martin and J. Van Reenen. (2016) Carbon Taxes, 
Path Dependency and Directed Technical Change: Evidence from the Auto Industry. Journal of 
Political Economy 124(1) 1-51. 
71. Schmalensee, R. (2012) ‘Path Dependence in Energy Systems.’ Lecture 5. Energy Decisions, 
Markets, and Policies. MIT Open Courseware. Sloan School of Management. Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology. http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/sloan-school-of-management/15-031j-energy-decisions-
markets-and-policies-spring-2012/video-lectures/lecture-5-path-dependence-in-energy-systems/  
721. Acemoglu, D., and Robinson, J. (2012) Why Nations Fail? The Origins of Power, Prosperity and 
Poverty. Crown Business. 
 
 
 
